Problems with F-35 especially with its Software laid Threadbare
Britain has received 14 F-35B jets out of a total of 48 it has committed to buying.
The plans are to eventually acquire 138 jets at a spend of roughly 12 billion dollars.
If the support costs over the Jets’ lifetime were to be added, the spend will easily be trebled.
Already people are questioning whether it is worthwhile to park billions of dollars in a project considering that it is facing one problem after the other at the outset itself.
What is the nature of problems F-35 is facing? Let us see
Problems with the software of F-35
To begin with, F-35s are not running a single software.
Different F-35 Jets are running so many different versions of their core software, that a US Department has warned of encumbering problems leading to delays in flight tests.
In the past, developers have addressed thousands of bug reports filed by pilots and engineers.
Software aboard Mach 1.6 stealth jets is identified by Block number.
It has been through tens of iterations, with Block 3F the latest version-having been through more than 30 versions by autumn last year.
In October 2017, the concerned department was preparing a second version of Block 3FR 6.3 (3FR 6.32), the 31st version of Block 3F, in an effort to remove the deficiencies.
US Department of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOTE) reported in January that “the final” Block 3FR 6.3 software released in October 2017 has already been superseded by two additional software updates.
In fact, more software patches will likely be needed as the programme seeks to resolve ongoing problems with weapons and avionics
Problems with F-35 especially with its Software laid Threadbare
DOTE Report said,” For Block 3F, the pilot is now able to see what coordinates are being sent to the bomb, but is not able to see what coordinates are actually loaded in the bomb.” In simple words, the software still cannot talk to guided air-to-ground bombs despite recent updates.
Another problem that trials showed is that AIM 120 AMRAAM missile cannot currently be used to its full potential by the supersonic stealth jet.
After 6 test firings, the pilots are still finding deficiencies in the ability of F-35s to employ the AIM-120 weapons.
One more problem being faced by F-35 is its inability to communicate with its unique PORTABLE MEMORY DEVICES (which are not USB sticks) at a reasonable speed
so much so that pilots frequently chose to manually enter mission planning data in the cockpit.
Despite recent efforts to speed this up with “updated transfer devices”, Portable Memory Device still takes too long and is problematic.
On the good side, the Autonomous Logistics Information System (ALIS) bundled with the F-35 is now running on Internet Explorer 11, after techies completed development of ALIS 2.0 and 2.5 in late 2017 to address some deficiencies.
(ALIS tracks every single component on the aircraft and appears to be the ultimate vendor lock-in software package).
However, this good news also comes with a pinch of salt as DOTE Report says that “ALIS version 3.0 is necessary to provide full combat capability…. the programme deferred to ALIS 4.0 capabilities previously designated for ALIS 3.0.
” ALIS 4.0 is scheduled for late 2018, but the developers are unlikely to meet the schedule.
That is not all. Using an ALIS in a laboratory is not the same as using it actually on-board F-35.
Fleet Personnel used it in ways that laboratory testers had not.
Problems other than the Software :
Britain’s experience shows that problems it is facing with its F-35s are not restricted to software alone.
1. An F-35B used for ground testing is unable to start third-life structural testing due to extensive repairs that were required to complete second-life testing.
2. Another F-35B used for tests had to be given unique “horizontal tail thermal barrier coatings” so that it could be flown in full afterburner for long enough, to collect necessary strain load data.
3. Yet another F-35B in flight sciences testing developed cracks which delayed testing.
4. DOTE warns that F-35B is though designed for a service life of 8000 hours, but failures during testing mean, it may be lesser even with extensive modifications to strengthen the aircraft.
So Lockheed Martin seriously needs to look into these problems, focus on reducing the complications to make the aircraft more incisive and relevant for air-warfare over next couple of decades to come.